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GUNS, CRIME, AND THE IMPACT OF STATE
RIGHT-TO-CARRY LAWS
John J. Donohue*
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States is a large country with nearly 200 million
guns in circulation,1 there is plenty of, shall we say, ammunition for
those seeking anecdotal evidence to support their views about guns.
These views are largely polarized between those who believe that
guns are primarily used to protect law-abiding citizens and those who
believe that guns mainly serve to exacerbate lethal violence-both
intentional and accidental-and encourage more frequent suicides.
Every day is likely to produce some gripping anecdote about how a
gun can be used defensively to thwart criminals, as well as some
wrenching account reflecting the frightening misuse of guns. A major
goal of scholarly research in this area is to move beyond mere
tendentious recitation of anecdotes to establish the true costs and
benefits of guns.
Those who have followed the troubling tales of alleged misconduct
in academic research by gun researchers Michael Bellesiles (from the
left)2 and John Lott (from the right)3 may draw the conclusion that in
America the topic of guns is so ideologically charged that no
researcher can be believed. While Gresham's Law may be operating
in the public's attitude toward gun research, this is unfortunate
because there are indeed some very serious researchers in this
domain, of whom Phil Cook and Jens Ludwig are among the most
important. It would be a sad fact if the cloud that Bellesiles and Lott
have cast over all gun research limited the influence of Cook and
Ludwig's careful and measured scholarly work.
For those who missed the contretemps, the left-leaning historian
Bellesiles wrote a book suggesting that the gun culture was far less
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic
Research. I wish to thank Michael Gottfried and David Powell for their excellent
research assistance.
1. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive
Survey of Gun Ownership and Use (1996).
2. Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun
Culture (2000); see also infra note 5.
3. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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prevalent in Colonial America than previously believed.4 Bellesiles's
book received widespread praise in certain circles, but allegations
soon surfaced that Bellesiles had manufactured some of his data.'
After Emory University, where he was a tenured professor, convened
a committee to look into the allegations, Bellesiles ended up losing his
job (although he continues to insist that at most he was sloppy in his
historical work). John Lott, who has championed the view that more
guns lead to less crime, was also accused-by one of Bellesiles' major
accusers, Northwestern Law Professor James Lindgren, as well as by
the eminent sociologist Otis Dudley Duncan-of manufacturing data
to support his claim that 98% of the time, merely brandishing the gun
was enough to terminate a violent attack.6 The point was important
because critics of the "more guns, less crime hypothesis" noted that if
defensive gun use were as prevalent as Lott has claimed-he accepts
claims that there are roughly 2.5 million defensive gun uses per yearone would expect that there would be far more dead criminals lying
around than the relatively meager number (less than 170 per year)
that the federal government identifies in the Uniform Crime Reports.7
Cook and Ludwig find that a more reasonable estimate is "that there
are about 100,000 instances per year in which someone uses a gun to
defend against an assault or break-in."8
Interestingly, while Bellesiles has been severely penalized, Lott has
avoided any negative repercussions, perhaps because his employer,
the American Enterprise Institute, has steadfastly refused to accede to
suggestions-such as that made by the editor of the prestigious
journal Science-that it impanel a committee of scholars to investigate
Lott's behavior.9 Indeed, if Lott were an academic, one would assume
that his school would follow Emory's lead and convene an
investigative committee to sort through the charges of academic
misconduct and evaluate Lott's denials that he manufactured the
4. Bellesiles, supra note 2.
5. See Stanley N. Katz et al., Report of the Investigative Committee in the
Matter of Professor Michael Bellesiles (July 10, 2002), available at
The report was
http://www.emory.edu/central/NEWS/Releases/Final-Report.pdf.
prepared by an independent committee appointed by Emory University, which
includes a summary of, and investigation into, the major criticisms. Id.
6. The details of the charges against Lott raised by Lindgren and Duncan are
recounted in exhaustive detail in a web page by the highly talented Australian
professor Tim Lambert. Tim Lambert, John Lott's Unethical Conduct, at
http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/-lambert/guns/lott98update.html (last modified Sept. 20,
2004). Lambert also notes that Lott has repeatedly generated estimates based on data
sets flawed by coding errors and refused to acknowledge these problems when the
errors were brought to his attention. Id.
7. FBI, Crime in the United States 2002: Uniform Crime Reports 28. Justifiable
homicide by private citizens using all types of firearms averaged almost 170 during
that period. Id.
8. Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73
Fordham L. Rev. 589 (2004).
9. Donald Kennedy, Research Fraudand Public Policy, 300 Science 393 (2003).
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survey allegedly supporting the 98% brandishing figure. The episode
may suggest that the opinions of those laboring at institutions that are
unwilling to enforce the highest standards of scholarly integrity should

trade at somewhat of a discount. °
But whether or not some of Lott's questionable practices in support

of his "more guns, less crime" hypothesis are unethical," he has still
raised a serious academic question that needs to be resolved: What is
the effect of a state's adoption of so called "right to carry" ("RTC")
laws? 2 While I completely agree with Cook and Ludwig that "the
best empirical evidence does not support" 3 the "more guns, less crime
hypothesis," I thought it might be useful to highlight some of the
issues in this debate and provide some new evidence that further
strengthens the Cook and Ludwig conclusion. I therefore begin with a

few comments that illuminate some of the key theoretical points
involving an evaluation of RTC laws, and then demonstrate the
fragility of some of the econometric models used to support Lott's
thesis, before offering an alternative econometric approach that may
yield better estimates of the impact of RTC laws.

10. As Steven Shapin has written:
[W]e are told things about the world [today] by people whom we do not
know, working in places we have not been. Trust is no longer bestowed on
familiar individuals; it is accorded to institutions and abstract capacities
thought to reside in certain institutions ...We trust the truth of specialized
and esoteric scientific knowledge without knowing the scientists who are the
authors of its claims.
Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenthcentury England 411 (1994).
11. Lott also used one or more pseudonyms to anonymously attack his critics and
buttress his own arguments and standing-a practice that Kennedy considered to be
fraudulent. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 393.
12. RTC laws are also called "shall-issue" laws in that they require government
officials to issue concealed weapons permits to all applicants of a certain age, who
have no felony criminal record and no recognized record of serious mental illness.
Indeed, federal law bans the mentally ill from purchasing guns if they have been
adjudicated to be mentally deficient or incompetent, or if they have been
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). But
the recent case of Charles McCoy, the alleged Ohio highway shooter, shows that even
those who are barred by these federal prohibitions from legally obtaining guns can
still purchase guns freely in the thirty-three states-including Ohio-"that have no
mechanism to enter court records concerning mental illness into the National Instant
Check System, the computer system that checks the background of gun purchasers."
Steve Stephens, Mentally Ill Can Pass Background Checks, The Columbus Dispatch,
March 17, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, Coldis File. Despite the fact that
he was a paranoid schizophrenic, McCoy would simply buy another gun when his
father would take away his other weapons, such as a 9mm semiautomatic pistol that
police tests indicated was used in nine of the twenty-four shootings. Having no felony
conviction, McCoy was able to easily buy guns at various retail gun outlets. Id.
13. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 8, at 595.
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I. SOME INSIGHTS INTO THE THEORY OF THE IMPACT OF RTC LAWS

Increasing the number of guns in circulation could conceivably
deter crime (good), shift its incidence from gun toters to non-gun
toters (bad), or increase crime, accidental death, and suicide
(horrible). John Lott and David Mustard have argued that the first of
these-crime deterrence-is the dominant influence of laws allowing
citizens to carry concealed handguns. 4 One possible consequence of
the carrying of a gun by a potential target of crime (even if illegally
carried) is that some crime will be deterred. Any such deterrence is a
clear social benefit, unless the carrying (whether legal or illegal)
facilitates other criminal conduct on the part of the gun toter (for
example, by a drug dealer packing heat for protection). A second
possible consequence, though, is that gun carrying may only shift the
burden of crime from a target likely to be able to use a gun to
someone who does not possess or who will not be in a position to use
a gun defensively at the moment of criminal attack. As an initial
approximation, this transfer rather than deterrence of criminal
victimization is not a social gain, and if one factors in the cost of the
gun, it becomes a net social cost. Moreover, it is clear that there are
times when having a gun would be helpful for self-defense. But the
benefit of having a gun available for the relatively rare times when
self-defense is needed comes at a price because the gun is constantly
subject to theft, accidental discharge, or the facilitation of suicidal
impulses. Even those who happen to resort to ostensibly legitimate
defensive gun use may find that (1) they are mistaken (for example,
the terrible killing of the Japanese exchange student in Baton Rouge
for which the gun-toting homeowner was found civilly liable)" or (2)
they are overwhelmed by their attacker in a way that makes the
possession of the gun contribute to one's loss from victimization
rather than reduce or avoid it.
An analysis of two horrible crimes in Parts I.A and I.B-the
Dartmouth College murders and the Oklahoma City bombingreveals how the complexity of the world has a way of defying the
simple lessons drawn from anecdotal evidence or predictions about
the consequences of either defensive gun use or gun control. Given
this complexity, only statistical analysis can hope to ascertain whether
the net effects of gun ownership and carrying-and the laws that
encourage or discourage such behavior-are positive or negative.
Part II will then respond to some of the claims that allowing law
abiding citizens to carry guns ensures that only benign consequences
will flow from adopting RTC laws, and Part III will evaluate some
14. John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26 J. Legal Stud. 1, 26 (1997).
15. Adam Nossiter, Judge Awards Damages in Japanese Youth's Death, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 16, 1994, at A12.
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new econometric evidence concerning the net effect of RTC laws on
crime.
A. Gun BrandishingSaves Lives-Or Does It?
In 2001, two boys aged sixteen and seventeen killed two popular
Dartmouth College professors in Hanover, New Hampshire.1 6 Since
their assault was with hunting knives, guns cannot be blamed for the
murders. Indeed, there is reason to credit guns with saving two lives
in the period prior to the Dartmouth killings, since the two boys had
previously planned on killing the inhabitants of a cabin in Vermont.
But when the boys knocked late one night, the Vermont cabin owner
refused to open the door to them and showed them a handgun
through a window. No gun was fired, but the mere brandishing of a
handgun certainly may have discouraged the two aspiring criminals
from trying to force their way into the house (they had already cut the
phone lines to the cabin). 7 It is not unreasonable to think that gun
ownership by the Vermont cabin owner did save him and his son,
which at first sounds like this was a case of crime deterrence. 8
But the ostensibly beneficial use of guns in this case might not show
up in any reduction in crime because the defensive gun use may have
saved two specific lives, without reducing the total number of killings.
In other words, this may be a case not of crime reduction, but rather a
case of crime transfer, since the gain of the two in Vermont was the
loss of the two in New Hampshire. Thus, a successful defensive use of
a gun through brandishing-as opposed to the killing of an
offender-may not reduce the total crime count if the offender just
moves on to the next target.
Of course, one might legitimately inquire whether the New
Hampshire murders could have been avoided if the Dartmouth
professors had had their own guns. Here, one can only speculate, but
it seems unlikely guns would have helped the Dartmouth professors
since the boys did not approach their New Hampshire house in the
way that prompted the Vermont cabin owner to reach for his gun
(with sudden, loud door knocks in the middle of the night), but rather
16. Lawrence J. Scholer, Zantop Murderers Sentenced: Tulloch Gets Life, The
at
available
2002,
April
9,
Review,
Dartmouth
http://dartreview.com/archives/2002/04/09/zantop-murderers-sentenced tulloch-gets_
life.php.
17. See id.
18. Id. All we know is that the cabin owner would have been viciously attacked if
he had opened the door to his cabin and that things worked out well for the cabin
owner when he showed a gun and refused to open the door. It is also possible that
things might have ended happily if he didn't have a gun and had just refused to open
the door. Still, without the brandishing, they might have (we will never know for
sure) tried to knock his door in, which would certainly have been a criminal violation
regardless of the outcome, and the gun was almost certainly a comfort for the cabin
owner who had to spend the night in the cabin with his phone lines cut. Id.
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through the disarming artifice of telling an environmental professor
that they were working on an environmental project. This ploy led
the professors to invite the boys into their house and converse with
them until the boys unexpectedly launched their murderous assault.
Even here, a gun might have helped save the wife if it had been in the
kitchen (or on her person) since the wife was there when her husband
was attacked in the living room and she was killed when she ran to the
living room after hearing his cries. If her instinct had been to run to
her husband first, having a gun somewhere in the house would not
have saved either of them. While deterring two murders generally
would end up saving lives, in this case, the amateurish criminal
conduct of the young killers suggests that they were going to be
caught if they succeeded in killing anyone.
Consequently, the
Vermont cabin owner's gun changed the names but in all likelihood
not the number of victims.
B. An UnpredictableResponse to the FederalAssault Weapon Ban
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the federal assault
weapon ban (which incidentally has just lapsed after 10 years).19 That
very day, Timothy McVeigh decided that he must respond violently to
this perceived insult to the Second Amendment.2"
Ultimately,
McVeigh decided that the appropriate response to Clinton's action
was to bomb the federal building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168
people, including nineteen children in a federal day care center.
McVeigh was part of the dangerous, extremist wing of the American
gun culture that uses the Second Amendment as a rallying cry in its
anti-government crusade.21 Thus, McVeigh, who was moved by the
right wing diatribe denouncing the deaths of children at the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, voiced no remorse over the
deaths he caused of the nineteen children in the federal building
bombing. The initial irony that a federal gun control measure
stimulated 168 murders is further compounded by the fact that state
gun control law led to McVeigh's capture. After McVeigh was
stopped for driving a car with no license plates (he later claimed that
he wanted to be caught so he would be put to death by the federal
19. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.);
see also William Douglas & Martin Kasindorf, Clinton Signs $30.2 Billion Crime Bill,
Denver Post, Sept. 14, 1994, available at LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File; Rachel L.
Swarns, Clock Ticks on Extension of Gun Ban, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2004, at A9; see
also Tamara Lytle & Henry Pierson Curtis, Weapons Ban Expires, Assault-Style Guns
Will Go Back on Sale, Orlando Sentinel, Sept. 14, 2004, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Orsent File.
20. Frontline provided a detailed historical account of McVeigh's plot. Frontline,
PBS,
McVeigh
Chronology,
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/documents/mcveigh/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2004).
21. Id.
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government), it was his possession of an illegal firearm that led to his
detention long enough for federal agents to connect him to the
Oklahoma City bombing. 2 If he had lived in a state such as Alaska,
which allows anyone to carry a gun without a permit, the police would
not have detained him, and one can only speculate as to whether this
determined killer would have done more harm before being stopped.
The case does illustrate how gun restrictions can at times aid law
enforcement efforts by making it easier to identify and apprehend
certain bad guys.
II. How CAN SOMETHING Go WRONG IF ONLY LAW-ABIDING
CITIZENS CAN GET HANDGUNS?

In November 2000 a forty-three-year-old man went to see the
movie 102 Dalmatians with a Glock pistol in his jacket.23 When he
went to don his jacket at the end of the movie, "something hung on
trigger of his gun, causing it to discharge" according to the police
the
24
report. Although the moviegoer had a valid Alabama pistol permit,
he ended up in critical condition in intensive care when a bullet ripped
into his abdomen. When I recounted this anecdote while giving a
lecture on RTC laws at Stanford University's Alumni Weekend, a
person in attendance insisted that nothing like that had ever
happened. But not surprisingly in a big country with lots of guns, such
events are not infrequent since every day of the year someone in
America is accidentally shooting himself or someone else (or just
Some pro-gun advocates are at times unwilling to
missing). 25
recognize that guns can lead to some bad outcomes just as anti-gun
advocates have at times been unwilling to recognize some of the
beneficial uses.
For example, Herbert Collins, 63, of Montgomery, Texas
accidentally shot himself in the ankle when his gun fell, causing the
trigger to engage. 6 Collins doesn't sound like someone who simply
didn't know how to use guns or who was unusually reckless. He was a
special adviser to the Kendleton Police Department and a pastor at a
church in Montgomery. At a recent college basketball tournament, an
off-duty police officer brought new meaning to March Madness when
he accidentally shot himself in the buttocks during the Atlantic Coast

22. Id.
23. Jon Anderson, Man Shot in Theater Wasn't Holding Pistol,Birmingham News,
Nov. 28,2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Birmnw File.
24. Id.
25. See Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, WISQARS Injury Mortality
Reports, 1999-2000, available at http://webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortratel0.html.
According to the CDC, accidental gun deaths in the U.S. are roughly 800 per year,
and it is safe to assume that injuries and near misses are many times that number. Id.
26. Accidental Shooting,The Courier (Texas), March 9, 2004.
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Conference quarterfinal game between Maryland and Wake Forest in
Greensboro, North Carolina. 7
Moreover, because guns are awkward and heavy, they are

sometimes left behind in dangerous areas such as planes and schools.
For example, just this month, an airline employee found a loaded
9mm handgun left on the seat of a Continental Airlines flight after it
landed in Newark.28 The gun had belonged to a Secret Service agent
traveling on the flight after declaring his gun possession.2 9 When one

adds in the roughly 1.5 million guns stolen every year, it is clear that
legally possessed guns frequently end up in the hands of criminals and

others who were not their intended users.3"

There can be little doubt that-other things being equal-more

carrying of guns contributes to more gun accidents. In a recent book,
David Hemenway presents evidence from various studies to argue
convincingly that the rate of suicide is elevated by the presence of

guns.31 But not all of the things that go wrong with guns carried by
lawful permit holders are mishaps or self-induced injuries. Consider
the case of Minnesotan Damian Peterson, who got into a heated
argument with his brother eight days after getting a concealed
handgun permit: Peterson "fired 11 bullets into a car, continuing to
fire as the car drove away through a residential neighborhood."3 2
Similarly, a good Samaritan named Louis Mockewich, who went to
the aid of a woman whose car was stuck in a snowbank in Philadelphia
during a bad winter storm in January 2000, precipitated a quarrel with
a neighbor when he shoveled some snow around another parked car,
27. Officer Hit In Buttocks When Own Gun Goes Off During ACC Game,
Associated Press, Mar. 12, 2004.
28. Brock N. Meeks, Airline Employee Finds Loaded Gun on Plane (May 3, 2004)
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894528.
29. The news story continued:
"This is not the first time this has happened," said an administration official
while confirming the incident to NBC News. "There have been one or two
other occasions where federal agents have left their firearms on board
planes," the administration official said, though he couldn't name which
agencies the officers worked for. The administration official also noted that
a federal air marshal recently left his weapon in an airport restroom.
Another recent incident involved a commercial airline pilot who was
qualified to carry a gun in the cockpit under the new Federal Flight Deck
Officer Program. During a shuttle ride from the aircraft the pilot left the
gun-which was inside a lockbox-behind on the shuttle. Another pilot
recognized the lockbox and retrieved it, according to a federal security
employee.
Id.
30. George J. Benston, The Supply of Handguns to Criminals: Evidence from
Firearms Tracing Data 9 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
31. David Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health 35-45 (2004).
32. Luis Tolley, Concealed and Carried;Proposed Legislation Puts Police and the
Public at Risk, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2003, availableat LEXIS, News
Library, Miljnl File.
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whose elderly owner complained. When the good Samaritan, who
had no criminal record but did have a permit to carry a concealed
handgun, yelled at the elderly man, the man's son-a well-liked youth
football coach-came out to complain. Mockewich killed him with a
single bullet fired into his chest. Mockewich then uttered "selfdefense" and walked away from the dying man and his father.33
Mockewich, an NRA member whose truck had a bumper sticker
"Armed with Pride," was sentenced to thirty years in prison for thirddegree murder.3 4 "If only the victim had been armed, this might not
have happened," a gun zealot might protest. In fact, though, the
victim had just put on his gun as he planned to take his mother to the
store. He never got it out of his holster before he was struck down.35
Clearly, the ability to qualify for a concealed gun permit is no
guarantee that the permit holder will never misuse a gun, nor does it
give any assurance that the permit holder will be able to protect
himself or keep the gun from falling into the wrong hands via
accidental loss or theft.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF RTC IS THE WORST
FORM OF EVALUATION-EXCEPT FOR ALL THE OTHERS

A. Using the Standard Panel Data Approach
With so many factors cutting in so many conflicting ways, the issue
of the impact of RTC laws on crime is a tricky empirical question that
can only be resolved through statistical analysis. Much ink has been
spilled in the effort to answer this question using panel data
econometric techniques.36 This statistical approach may be the best
hope for ascertaining the impact of the law, but, unfortunately, small
changes in the statistical modeling can have large effects on the
estimated effects. To illustrate this fact, I present a number of
different specifications in Figures 1 to 9, with each Figure estimating
the effect on each of the nine FBI Index I crime categories.37 Because
of the powerful ideological motivations of many gun researchers, a
legitimate fear is that an analyst trying to prove a certain point might
33. See Elisa Ung, Man Faces Trial Over Shooting, Phila. Inquirer, Feb. 3, 2000, at

B1; see also Robert Moran & Thomas J. Gibbons, Jr., Man Shot, Killed In Snow
Dispute, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 27, 2000, at Al.
34. Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Killer in Snow Dispute Gets 30-Year Term, Phila.
Inquirer, Dec. 8, 2000, at B1.
35. See Ung, supra note 33.
36. In this Essay, the panel data is data collected for all fifty states over the period
1977-1999. Looking at this combined cross-section and time series data is much more
powerful than simply examining a single time series (the before and after effect of a
law adopted in one state) or at a single cross-section (looking, say, at all fifty states at
only one point in time).
37. See infra figs. 1-9.
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choose among a vast array of possible statistical models simply to
generate a desired result. To address this concern, I report not only a

modified version of Lott's original model (called the "Modified Lott"
set of explanatory variables),38 but also the results of three other

models that were developed by researchers to answer questions
having nothing to do with RTC laws-one by Wentong Zheng
(developed to look at the impact of lotteries on crime),39 one by
William Spelman (developed to look at the impact of incarceration on
crime),' and one by John Donohue and Steve Levitt (developed to

look at the impact of abortion legalization on crime)."

These four

different sets of explanatory variables are set forth in Table 1.42

Whatever infirmities these last three models have, we know that they
were created by serious academics without any intention of skewing
the estimates of the impact of RTC laws. When we add a variable
identifying the date of adoption of the RTC laws to these pre-existing
statistical models, we can see if the results support-or refute-the
more guns, less crime hypothesis.43
Let's start with the one crime-robbery in Figure 4--for which we
would expect to see a reduction in crime if the "more guns, less crime"
38. The "Modified Lott" model starts with Lott's original set of explanatory
variables and replaces one particularly questionable variable-the arrest rate-with a
lagged incarceration rate. The problems with the arrest rate as Lott used it are
numerous: the variable is poorly measured and not exogenous (that is, it is not fair to
assume that arrest rates influence crime since crime in year t will also influence the
number of arrests in year t divided by the amount of crime in year t-thus, the
contemporaneous crime rate ends up on both sides of the regression equation).
39. Computer program supplied to author by Wentong Zheng, graduate student
in Economics, Stanford University.
40. William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in The Crime
Drop in America 97 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).
41. John J. Donohue and Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on
Crime, 116 Q. J. of Economics 379 (2001).
42. All of the estimates presented in this Essay are based on state crime data,
which is the approach used in the work by Zheng, Spelman, and Donohue & Levitt.
While Lott does present estimates of the impact of RTC laws using state data, he
prefers to use county data. I have been persuaded, though, that the county crime data
is considerably less accurate than the state data, and since the intervention of
interest-the adoption of a state RTC law-applies at the state level, I am more
comfortable with the state data than with the county data.
43. Interestingly, one might think that identifying the date of adoption of an RTC
law would be easy, but even on this issue there is disagreement. It is not always
straightforward to identify the precise date among a number of competing statutory
enactments, when citizens of a state had a right to carry concealed handguns without
demonstrating the need for a gun to a governmental official. Table 2 presents a
number of different codings of RTC adoptions, and one can see that there are a
number of differences across the various authors. See infra tbl. 2. This Essay will rely
on my latest coding scheme identified in the fourth column of Table 2. Id. Luckily,
since most of the disputed dates are in small states whose impact in a populationweighted regression will necessarily be smaller, the coding issues do not seem to
influence the results too strongly. Nonetheless, the coding issue illustrates how even
simple issues become complex and disputed in empirical work.
44. See infra fig. 4.
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hypothesis were true. The dummy model is the simplest statistical
model, which simply tries to determine whether on average, and
controlling for the various explanatory variables of Table 1, crime was
higher or lower after RTC adoption. These before and after estimates
can be generated in either of two ways: as a single estimate for the
aggregate of all adopting states, or as multiple individual estimates for
each adopting state (which can then also be averaged). Beginning
with this dummy model and using the Modified Lott set of
explanatory variables that are set forth in column 1 of Table 1, we see
four columns on the far left of Figure 4. The first thick column in
Figure 4 shows that four more states had positive estimates-implying
that the RTC law increased crime-than had negative estimates
(suggesting crime decreases).45 One might argue that the first column
numbers are less meaningful because they count positive and negative
estimates that are not statistically significant in calculating the overall
difference. The last of the four columns above "Dummy" in the
"Modified Lott" portion of Figure 4 limits the analysis to statistically
three more of the state estimates
significant estimates and finds that
41
Column 3 takes a population
are positive than are negative.
weighted average of all the estimated state-specific effects and
highlights whether the result is statistically significant by using a bright
(dark) color. 7 Column 2 avoids getting individual state estimates and
simply generates an aggregated statistical estimate from the overall
model. For this model ("Dummy" using "Modified Lott"), neither of
the estimates of the aggregated effects of the RTC laws is negative or
statistically significant, and thus there is no support in that model for
the "more guns, less crime hypothesis" with respect to robbery.
Indeed, the aggregate of the state specific effects (column 3) is close to
4%, which, if true, would indicate a rather substantial increase in
robbery.
The same four column estimates are generated for the second
model, which replicates the first, with one exception-rather than just
looking at whether crime is lower or higher, the "dummy with state
trends model" tries to see whether crime simply followed a preexisting trend at the time of adoption. 48 Here the results are terrible
for the Lott model: columns 1 and 4 reveal that most states
experienced crime jumps (whether one looks at all states or only those
with statistically significant estimates) and columns 2 and 3 suggest

45. The numbers associated with the first and fourth columns should be read from
the index on the right hand side of the Table. See infra tbl. 4
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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that robbery increased by over 5% (with both estimates being
statistically significant).49
Looking to the third set of "Modified Lott" models-the spline
model-we see that one estimate (in column 2) suggests that crime
goes down while the other estimates suggest the opposite.5 0 The spline
model attempts to ascertain whether there is a change in the trend of
crime after adoption.
These figures were constructed so that visually one would get a
sense of whether the estimated crime effects were positive (in which
case the RTC laws would increase crime and the columns would go
upward) or negative (in which case the opposite would be true). The
overwhelming impression from Figure 4 is that RTC laws increase
crime. Yet, despite the fact that only 8 of the 48 columns are negative,
one can immediately see the danger from someone who wishes to
portray the data tendentiously. All one has to do is cherry-pick the
estimates and present the aggregate spline model (as opposed to the
weighted mean of the individual state estimates) using the "Modified
Lott" or Zheng variables, which generates statistically significant
negative estimates in the neighborhood of 1-2%. Of course, such
conduct would violate statistical conventions, but this showing does
reveal that even when the evidence points strongly in one direction,
there are often scattered estimates that cut in the other direction
against the weight of the evidence.
If one looks at the assault and even more powerfully at the violent
crime figures, the evidence again supports-if anything-a positive
relationship between RTC laws and crime. But again, a tendentious
presentation of the data could find negative estimates, including a
negative and statistically significant estimate of the impact of RTC
laws on assault. On the four property crime categories, the estimates
are overwhelmingly in the direction of suggesting increases in crime,
but even there one could find two negative and statistically significant
estimates for burglary."
In fact, the only two crimes for which the visual impact of the
corresponding Figure is not overwhelmingly suggestive of a crime
increase rather than a decrease are murder 2 and rape. 3 My basic read
of the evidence on murder is that it provides no evidence of a drop in
murder resulting from the adoption of the RTC law, despite the one
statistically significant negative estimate. Given that there are 24
different estimates, the fact that only 1 of 24 is negative and
significant, while 13 of the 24 estimates are positive, is more suggestive

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
See infra figs. 6-9.
See infra fig. 2.
See infra fig. 3.

2004]

STATE RIGHT-TO-CARRY LAWS

of a random influence rather than a true impact of the law.54 Indeed,
looking at the state-specific estimates, one finds that 11 of the 12 sets
of estimates show more states have crime increases (and 8 of 12 have
more states with statistically significant positive estimates).
For the crime of rape, however, the visual impression is that RTC
laws are associated with lower rates of crime. This is not to suggest
that there are no estimates suggesting crime increases, but the weight
of the statistical evidence in Figure 3 seems to be suggestive of crime
reduction.5
For the four property crimes (although least powerfully for
burglary), the data is suggestive only of crime increases associated
with the adoption of the law.56 At this point, if one were to rely on the
statistical evidence from these four sets of standard fixed effects panel
data models-about which we will raise some concerns presentlyjudging
one would probably reach the following conclusion:
impressionistically, adoption of RTC laws seems to be associated with
crime increases in all crime categories except murder, where the mixed
evidence is probably most consistent with there being no impact, and
rape, where the evidence is suggestive of crime decreases.
B. An Alternative to the StandardPanel Data Model
Before we pause to reflect on whether such a pattern seems
plausible as the causal outcome of the adoption of RTC laws, we
should consider an alternative approach to the standard fixed-effects,
panel data estimation. My work with Ian Ayres presented evidence
that the aggregated specifications employed by Lott are unreliable
because they assign more weight to early-adopting states (states
adopting RTC laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s) than lateradopting states.57 The problem stems from the fact that the standard
models of the type shown in Figures 2 through 10 can be heavily
influenced by changes that occur long after the adoption of the RTC
law, which in itself is problematic, but is even more troubling since
this effect can only occur for early adopting states (since there is no
evidence beyond three years after adoption for some of the lateadopting states). We examined the effect of shall-issue law adoption
on a year-by-year basis and discovered that the model estimated very
large swings in crime 10+ years post-adoption.58 These large swings
occur, not because shall-issue laws suddenly deter crime over 10 years
after adoption, but because some of the late-adopting states dropped
out of the analysis at that point. These large swings, which tend to
54. See infra fig. 2.
55. See infra fig. 3.
56. See infra figs. 6-9.
57. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less
Crime" Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1245 (2003).
58. Id.; see also infra figs. 2-10.
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make the RTC laws look much better than they really are, are
probably the result of the failure of the crime models to control for
the influence of crack on crime, which was substantial in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.5 9
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab ("ADS") examined the effect of
wrongful discharge laws on employment and developed a method to
avoid the problem of inadvertently weighting early-adopting states
disproportionately.'
The basic idea of this model is to limit the
number of years pre- and post-adoption that can affect the estimates
of the shall-issue dummy. This limited window is centered around the
shall-issue adoption data and will be referred to as the "treatment
period." The model, then, compares the change in the crime rate
from the pre- to the post-period (within the treatment period) to the
change in the crime rates of the states that did not adopt a shall-issue
law during that period. Thus, a state can be both part of the control
group and the treatment group, just not at the same time. The model
also controls for other covariates, state-fixed effects, and year-fixed
effects. A dummy variable is also included for the post-treatment
period. This specification is shown below, where s indexes the state
and t indexes the year:
LnC, = a + 30 (Treatment1 ) + 3,(Posts,) + P32
(Postpost,) + 8X, + y,+
Yt

+

Ft

Treatment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is within z years
of the shall-adoption year where z is varied. Post is equal to 1 starting
the year after shall-issue adoption and ending z years after adoption.
Postpost is equal to 1 starting z+i years after adoption. 03 is the
coefficient of interest. X represents the covariates included in the
Modified Lott specification seen previously.
Importantly, the ADS specification allows for an "adjustment
period," by excluding some observations.6 In this case, I have always
excluded the year that a shall-issue law was adopted since it cannot be
cleanly placed in the pre- or post-period. I have also varied this model
by sometimes also excluding the year immediately after adoption to
allow even more time for the crime rate to adjust.

59. See Bruce D. Johnson et al., The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug
Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in The Crime Drop in America, supra
note 40, at 164.
60. See Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws,
NBER
Working
Paper
#9425
(Dec.
2002),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9425.
61. The ADS specification uses Huber-White standard errors, which allow for
arbitrary error correlations within states. In addition, the ADS specification weights
by population shares instead of just population counts. This technique avoids
weighting later observations simply due to national population increases. This final
change is inconsequential to the results.
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Figure 10 shows the results using four different specifications that
vary the treatment period between five and seven years and the
adjustment period between one year and two years.62 These choices
seem reasonable to understand the effects of shall-issue laws, given
both the likely time of adjustment and the limitations imposed by
data. Again, these estimates are unaffected by arbitrary fluctuations
in crime more than three years after the year of adoption. Notice that
there are no statistically significant negative coefficients, and the RTC
laws are associated with increased larceny and auto theft (and, at a
lower level of significance, overall property crime). Figure 10 again
shows that there is absolutely no support for the more guns, less crime
hypothesis. 63 The violent crime and burglary estimates are all
statistically significant and the other property crimes seem to
experience significant crime increases. If one preferred this approach
over the earlier standard panel data model results presented in
Figures 1 to 9, 6' one would essentially discard the previous suggestion
that RTC laws reduce rape, and conclude that RTC laws appear to
have no effect on violent crime and increase property crime (except
for burglary) during the first two or three years following adoption.
In evaluating the plausibility of this conclusion, one must consider
the following issues. One, we know there is a substantial omitted
variable bias lurking in all of these regressions because of the inability
to control carefully for the influence of crack on crime. How does this
skew the analysis? The Ayres and Donohue article showed that the
initial Lott and Mustard estimates, which used data from 1977-1992,
were badly skewed because in the 1985-1992 period the adopting
states did not have big crack-induced crime increases, while the nonadopting states like New York, California, Illinois, and Michigan did
have big crime increases.65 This explains why crime rose so much
faster in the non-adopting states during the 1985-1992 period (even
though Lott and Mustard attributed this disparity to their failure to
adopt RTC laws), and also why crime fell so much more in the nonadopting states in the post-crack period after 1992. 6 Thus, the early
adopters appear to be much better at reducing crime than they likely
are, and the late adopters appear to be much worse in increasing
crime. Two possibilities exist: the biases cancel each other out and
the resulting Figure 10 estimates can be taken as reasonably accurate,
or the biases cut one way or the other.67 It is at least possible that the
62. I also extended the period of examination to four years on either side of the
adopting year and got similar results. I do not report those results, however, because
they are still somewhat affected by the concern that one does not have four years of
post-passage data on the 1996 RTC adopters.
63. See infra fig. 10.
64. See infra figs. 1-9.
65. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 57, at 1217-18.
66. Lott & Mustard, supra note 14, at 18-19.
67. See infra fig. 10.
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Figure 10 results are biased in favor of the more guns, less crime
hypothesis, particularly for violent crime, which rose so sharply during
the crack epidemic. If this were true, then the apparent finding of no
effect on violent crime but increases in property crime may be
inaccurate and the true effect might be that RTC laws yield acrossthe-board crime increases. 61
But are RTC laws likely to cause any property crime increases? It
is certainly not clear what the causal mechanism behind such an
increase might be. Lott and Mustard suggest a substitution effect as
robbers try to avoid the newly armed populace and thus resort to
property crimes of stealth.69 This might not be a bad tradeoff-if it
were true. But since we saw no evidence of any decline in robberyFigures 4 and 10 actually show increases in robbery, although the
latter figures are not statistically significant-the empirical support
for this thesis is nonexistent. Also, as a theoretical matter, it is not
clear how dissuading a criminal from rape or assault could encourage
the thwarted criminals to steal cars and hubcaps.
Where does this leave us? Based on the current evidence, it would
seem that one needs to make a judgment about whether the crime
models presented in this Essay are working well. If the judgment is
that they are, then one would have to embrace the finding that
property crime will be higher when RTC laws are adopted.
Conversely, some might contend that the fact that the models suggest
that RTC laws increase property crime is itself the best evidence that
the statistical models are not working well. In any event, there is no
evidence here that would support the more guns, less crime
hypothesis.
CONCLUSION

With cable TV and talk radio degrading the quality of policy
discourse, and with the public being exposed to a seemingly endless
array of lies, distortions, and frauds from both the government and the
corporate and retail sectors of the economy, it is alarming to see a
similar pattern demonstrated in the academic realm. As I have shown
in this Essay, there are enough opportunities for ideologically driven
analysts to cherry-pick their preferred model to reach results that they
find congenial, even if in so doing, the truth is the first casualty. All
we can really say is that we know that there is no evidence of
reduction in violent crime when RTC laws are passed, and that,
although there is evidence of increases in property crime, the
theoretical basis for such a finding is weak. We do know that anything
68. I would expect, though, that the Figure 10 estimates are less likely to be biased
than those presented in Figures 1 to 9 because the Figure 10 estimates are generated
over a shorter time frame of five or seven years. See infra figs 1-10.
69. Lott & Mustard, supra note 14, at 64.

2004]

STATE RIGHT-TO-CARRY LAWS

that increases the number of guns in circulation will increase the
number of guns in the hands of criminals, since about 1.5 million guns
are stolen every year.70 It may be that concealed carry laws spur some
crime in that way (offsetting any benefits the law might generate). It
also may be the case that as potential victims arm themselves, some
criminals are deterred while others simply increase their armament
and shoot faster. There can also be an emboldening effect that makes
some who did not intend to become criminals lapse into that camp
when they get stressed in some way and now have a gun that can turn
a shouting match into an aggravated assault or death.
This Essay has tried to illustrate the net effects of RTC laws by
presenting causal models from which one can determine whether the
gun law in question causes crime to rise, fall, or remain unchanged.
While developing this factual information is undoubtedly important, it
is possible that an ultimate evaluation of RTC laws, as well as other
forms of gun control, should pursue a different objective. An
alternative approach would first identify the best possible global set of
laws, practices, and institutions, and then evaluate RTC laws by the
extent to which their adoption will succeed in moving society in the
direction of the globally best solution. If the socially desirable
solution is to impose greater controls on guns, then RTC laws
probably can be viewed as harmful in that they entrench more gun
owners, thereby strengthening the NRA while undermining the
prospects of greater future gun control legislation. Under this
approach, one might deem the Brady Bill 7' to be valuable legislation
even if it has yielded no discernible crime-reduction benefits, because
it represents a step in the right direction designed to help move
society closer to a social welfare optimum, such as the registration of
all handguns. In determining the contours of the socially optimal
solution, I would trust Cook and Ludwig far more than John Lott and
the NRA.
A final concern is that our statistical models are simply too blunt an
instrument to ascertain the likely modest impact of RTC laws on
overall crime. This does not mean that their effect is zero, but only
that if crime rose or fell by 1-2%, our models might not be able to
accurately detect such a change given all the problems of omitted
variables (for example, the crack cocaine epidemic) and endogenous
state adoption (these laws are adopted in part in response to crime
70. See Benston, supra note 30.
71. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000)), also known as the "Brady Bill," was
enacted on November 30, 1993 and imposed (as an interim measure) a waiting period
of five days before a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer could sell, deliver, or
transfer a handgun to an unlicensed individual. The waiting period was replaced in
November 1998 by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS),
which verifies available records on persons who may be disqualified from receiving
firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2000).
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rather than in the random fashion that would help ascertain their true
impact). But what if it turned out that the impact of these laws on
crime were truly zero? In this event, society would be confronted with
an interesting choice: Should we allow the 2 or 3% of the population
who wish to secure concealed carry permits to expend their money on
a net useless product, or should we let the much larger segment of the
population deprive the small minority of their intense preference for
guns? Tradeoffs between the intense preferences of a small minority
versus less intense preferences of a larger population raise difficult
issues for democracies. One suspects that intensity of preferences
tends to count for a great deal, and since it would appear that a lot
more Americans are willing to commit violence against gun control
advocates than are willing to attack the NRA leadership, it is clear
that on intensity of preference grounds, the pro-gun forces will likely
enjoy greater electoral success. Indeed, under current conditions, it is
impossible to achieve truly effective gun legislation, because the NRA
forces will always manage to eviscerate any truly effective gun bill.
We must look to scholars such as Cook and Ludwig to help us discern
the marginal steps that can be taken to reduce gun violence in a
politically acceptable fashion.
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Table 1: Different Models Used to Estimate the Impact of RTC Laws
Stanford Law Review
(Modified Lott)

Zheng

DonohueLeviti

Spomn

36 rac- age categories

%black
%15-17
%18-24
%151

%black
%10-14
%15-17
%18-24

%25-34

%25-34

Control Variables:

Demographic

Population size

Population size

Population density
%metro

%metro
Personal income per
capita

Income per capita

log (per capita income)

log (per capita income

Unemployment

log (unemployment

insurance per capita

rate)

Economic:
PerCapitaincome
maintenance

Laggedincarceration
rare

Poverty rate

Poverty rate

Laggedprisoners per

log (tagged prisoners

capita

per capita)

log (lagged
incarceration rate)

Criminal
Laggedpolice per
capita

log (aggedpolice per
capita)

Alcohol consumption

Effective abortion rate

tog (police per capita)

per capita
Other:
Governor party
affiliation dummies
Statefixed effects
Year fixed effects
Regression Type:
Additional notes:

Yes
Yes
OLS

Yes
Yes
OLS
No D.C.

Yes
Yes
OLS, adjusted for serial
correlation with fixed
effects (Bhargava)

Yes
Yes
OLS, standard erors
adjusted for clustering
atstat-evel
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